Standfirst:
When a serious risk of grave international crimes is evident, states are not neutral bystanders. International law imposes duties to prevent, to avoid aiding or assisting wrongful acts, and—under arms-trade rules—to deny exports where the risk to civilians is overriding.

Why this matters

Arms transfers, intelligence-sharing, and logistical support can shift from “cooperation” to “complicity” when credible evidence points to serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law (IHRL). Decisions by export-control authorities and ministries now routinely face judicial and parliamentary scrutiny.

Legal framework

  • Genocide Convention (1948): Duty to prevent genocide; complicity is punishable (Arts I, III(e), IV).

  • ICJ, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (2007): Duty to prevent is one of conduct—states must use all means reasonably available, proportionate to capacity to influence and gravity of risk.

  • Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA): Art. 16 bars knowingly aiding or assisting another state’s internationally wrongful act.

  • Arms Trade Treaty (2013): Arts 6–7 require denial of exports where there is an overriding risk of serious IHL/IHRL violations; mitigation must be specific and credible.

  • Rome Statute (1998): Individual liability for aiding and abetting international crimes (Art. 25(3)).

What compliance requires in practice

  1. Risk recognition: Use open-source reporting, UN/ICRC findings, and allied intelligence to determine whether a serious risk exists.

  2. Proportionate action: Where risk is serious, adopt all feasible measures within your capacity—suspending transfers, tightening end-use monitoring, or conditioning cooperation.

  3. No “blind” assistance: Under ARSIWA Art. 16, knowledge of circumstances + contribution can trigger responsibility—even if the assisting state does not share the principal’s motives.

  4. ATT decision record: Written, reviewable risk assessments aligned to ATT Art. 7, specifying mitigation and automatic suspension triggers (e.g., patterns of attacks on civilians).

Accountability pathways

  • Domestic review: Courts may examine licensing decisions and demand disclosure of risk analyses.

  • Parliamentary oversight: Mandated reporting on ATT decisions, diversion incidents, and mitigation compliance.

  • International processes: ICC or universal-jurisdiction cases (where applicable) for individuals; state-to-state responsibility claims.

  • Sanctions and embargoes: Targeted measures to avoid state complicity and incentivize compliance.

Policy recommendations

  • Presumption of denial in contexts of sustained, well-documented serious violations, with cabinet-level override only in exceptional, reasoned cases.

  • Transparent ATT assessments (public summaries) and real-time end-use monitoring.

  • Early-warning legal risk cell connecting foreign, defense, trade, and justice ministries to independent legal experts.

  • Cooperation conditionality tied to verifiable civilian-protection benchmarks.

Editor’s note (opinion): In high-risk theatres, front-loaded restraint—paired with verifiable safeguards—reduces legal exposure and strengthens long-term strategic credibility.

References 

Genocide Convention (1948); ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia (2007); ILC, ARSIWA (2001), Art. 16; Arms Trade Treaty (2013), Arts 6–7; Rome Statute (1998), Art. 25(3).